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ABSTRACT 
 
Canonical Correlation and Assortative Matching: A 
Remark* 
 
In the context of the Beckerian theory of marriage, when men and women match on a single-
dimensional index that is the weighted sum of their respective multivariate attributes, many 
papers in the literature have used linear canonical correlation, and related techniques, in 
order to estimate these weights. We argue that this estimation technique is inconsistent and 
suggest some solutions. 
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Introduction. Since Beckers (1973) seminal contribution, the marriage market has been
predominantly modeled as a matching market with transferable utility. Men and women
are characterized by vectors of attributes denoted respectively x 2 Rdx for men and y 2 Rdy
for women. These vectors may incorporate various dimensions such as education, wealth,
health, physical attractiveness, etc. It is assumed that when a man with attributes x and
a woman with attributes y form a pair, they generate a surplus equal to  (x; y). This
surplus is shared endogenously between the two partners. Denoting P and Q the respective
probability distributions of attributes of married men and women, it follows from the results
of Shapley and Shubik (1972) that the stable matching will maximize
E [ (X;Y )]
with respect to all joint distributions of (X;Y ) such that X  P and Y  Q. For conve-
nience, we assume that these distributions are centered
R
xdP (x) =
R
ydQ (y) = 0.
Becker went further in the analysis by assuming that sorting occurs on single-dimensional
ability indices for men and women, say x and y, which are constructed linearly with respect
to the original attributes
x = 0x and y = 0y
where  2 Rdx and  2 Rdy are the weights according to which the various attributes
enter the respective indices. Following Becker (1973), assume that the matching surplus of
individuals of attributes x and y, denoted  (x; y), only depends on the indices x and y and
takes the form
 (x; y) = 
 
0x; 0y

where  is supermodular, that is @2x;y (x; y)  0. As a result, the optimal solution ex-
hibits positive assortative matching, that is, the equilibrium distribution of the attributes
across couples is represented by a joint random vector (X;Y )   where 0X and 0Y are
comonotone: the man at percentile t in the distribution of 0X is matched with the woman
at percentile t in the distribution of 0Y . In other words, denoting FZ the cumulative
distribution function of Z, we can state as the main assumption of this note that:
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Assumption 1. There are weights  and  such that the indices 0X and 0Y are comonotone,
that is
F0Y
 
0Y

= F0X
 
0X

:
If the cumulative distribution function F0Y is invertible, one may then write
0Y = T
 
0X

where T (z) = F 1
0Y F0X (z) is a nondecreasing map; thus the ability index of a woman is
a nondecreasing function of that of the man she is matched with.
Given this specication and the observation of (X;Y )  , one would like to estimate
(; ). To this end, Becker (1973) suggested (p. 834) to use Canonical Correlation Analysis,
a technique originally introduced by Hotelling (1936). This method consists in determining
the weights c and c that maximize the correlation between 
0X and 0Y . Formally,
introducing the following notations
XY = E

XY 0

; X = E

XX 0

; Y = E

Y Y 0

;
Canonical Correlation consists in dening c and c as the maximizers of the correlation of
0X and 0Y over all possible vectors of weights  and . The problem therefore consists
in solving the following program
max
2Rdx ;2Rdy
0XY  (1)
s:t: 0X = 1 and 0Y  = 1
whose value at optimum is in general less or equal than one.
In the applied literature,  and  are frequently estimated by multivariate Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression. It is worth remarking that this is closely related, but not
quite identical to, Canonical Correlation. Consider the following OLS regression
Y1 = 
0X   0 1Y 1 + "
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where " is an error term, Y1 is the top element of Y , and Y 1 the vector of the remaining
entries. Let ^ and ^ 1 be the coe¢ cients obtained from OLS. Introducing ^ =

1 ^
0
 1
0
,
it is easy to show that

^; ^

solves the program
max
2Rdx ;2Rdy
0XY 
s:t: 0X = A and 0Y  = B and 1 = 1:
where A = ^0X ^ and B = ^
0
Y ^. Without the constraint 1 = 1, this would yield
the same solutions (up to some rescaling of  and ) as the solutions given by Canonical
Correlation. In general, the solutions di¤er due to this constraint. Even though the OLS
technique is better known and more immediately accessible to practitioners, it articially
breaks down symmetry between variables by singling out the role of Y1. Note that in the
case where Y is univariate (dy = 1) the constraint 1 = 1 has no bite, and the two solutions
coincide (again, up to rescaling).
Following Beckers original proposal, many papers have used Canonical Correlation or
OLS techniques to estimate  and . Notable examples of the application of Canonical
Correlation on the marriage market are Suen and Lui (1999), Gautier et al. (2005) and
Taubman (2006). Many papers have applied OLS techniques to study assortative mating
when faced with multiple dimensions, see Kalmijn (1998) for a survey of this literature.
A notable example of such applications of OLS is the extensive literature on the e¤ect of
a wifes education on her husbands earnings: see among others Benham (1974), Scully
(1979), Wong (1986), Lam and Schoeni (1993, 1994), and Jepsen (2005).
The consistency problem. A crucial question is whether the Canonical Correlation
method is consistent, namely whether (c; c) = (; ). It turns out that the answer is yes
in the case of Gaussian marginal distributions P and Q, but no in more general cases as we
shall now explain. We now state our result. The main statement, part (ii) of the theorem,
is proven using a counterexample.
Theorem 1 ((In-)Consistency of Canonical Correlation). The following holds:
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(i) If P and Q are Gaussian distributions, then the Canonical Correlation is consistent
in the sense that
(c; c) = (; ) :
(ii) In general, Canonical Correlation is not consistent.
Proof. (i) When P = N (0;X) and Q = N (0;Y ), with ;  6= 0 two vectors of weights,
then
max
XP;YQ
E

0XY 0

=
p
0X
p
0Y ;
where the optimization is over the set of random vectors (X;Y ) with xed marginal distri-
butions P and Q. Thus, for (X ;Y ) solution of the above problem, the correlation between
0X and 0Y is one. Indeed, the optimal (X;Y ) is such that
0Y =
s
0Y 
0X
0X:
The result is immediate: for the optimal (X;Y ), the correlation between 0X and 0Y is
one and since this is the maximal value of Program (1), it follows that (; ) = (c; c).
(ii) However, when P and Q fail to be Gaussian, the canonical correlation estimator
(c; c) di¤ers from the true parameters (; ) in general, as seen in the following example.
Let P be the distribution of (X1; X2) where X1 takes value 1 with probability 1=2 and  1
with probability 1=2, and X2 is exponentially distributed with parameter 1 and independent
of X1. Let G be the c.d.f. of X2, so that G (z) = 1   exp ( z). Let Q = U ([0; 1]). Set
1 = 2 = 1=
p
2, so that X^ = X1+X2p
2
. Hence the optimal coupling

X^; Y^

is such that
Y^ = FX^

X^

where FX^ (:) is the c.d.f. of X^, which is expressed as
FX^ (x) =
1
2

G

x
p
2 + 1

+G

x
p
2  1

:
Thus
Y^ =
8<: 12 (G (X2) +G (X2   2)) if X1 =  11
2 (G (X2 + 2) +G (X2)) if X1 = 1;
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and a calculation shows that
cov

X1; Y^

=
EG (X2 + 2)  EG (X2   2)
4
and as EG (X2 + 2) = 1  e 2=2 and EG (X2   2) = e 2=2, we get
cov

X1; Y^

=
1
4
 
1  e 2 : (2)
Similarly,
E
h
X2Y^
i
=
1
4
E [X2G (X2   2)] + 1
4
E [X2G (X2 + 2)] +
1
2
E [X2G (X2)]
and using the fact that E [X2G (X2   2)] = 7e 2=4, that E [X2G (X2 + 2)] = 1  e 2=4, and
that E [X2G (X2)] = 3=4, we get E
h
X2Y^
i
=
 
3e 2 + 5

=8, hence, as E [X2]E
h
Y^
i
= 1=2,
one gets
cov

X2; Y^

=
3e 2 + 1
8
: (3)
Now the Canonical Correlation estimator (c1; 
c
2) of (1; 2) solves in this setting
max
^1;^2
^1cov (X1; Y ) + ^2cov (X2; Y )
s:t: ^21 + ^
2
2 = 1
which implies
c2
c1
=
cov

X2; Y^

cov

X1; Y^
 :
Using (2) and (3), this becomes
c2
c1
=
3 + e2
2e2   2 6=
2
1
= 1:
Therefore the Canonical Correlation estimator is not consistent in this example. 
Note that the example in part (ii) of the proof also shows that OLS is inconsistent. In
this example the dimension of Y is one, so that OLS and Canonical Correlation yield the
same estimators of  and . The above example has nothing pathological and implies that
estimators of (; ) based on Canonical Correlation face the risk of being biased as soon as
the marginal distributions are not Gaussian.
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Final remarks. The problem discussed in this paper obviously raises the question: how
can we replace Canonical Correlation by a technique that is consistent? One rst proposal
is to look for  and  that maximize Spearmans rank correlation between 0X and 0Y .
In other words, look for
max
2Rdx ;2Rdy
E

F0X
 
0X

F0Y
 
0Y

s:t: 0X = 1 and 0 = 1:
where we recall that F0X stands for the c.d.f. of 0X. The value of this program cannot
exceed 1/3 and, when the distributions of X and Y are continuous, it is equal to 1/3 when
0X and 0Y are comonotone. However the objective function, which can be rewritten asZ
Pr
 
max
 
0 (x X) ; 0 (y   Y )  0 dFX (x) dFY (y) ;
has no reason to be convex with respect to  and , so global optimization techniques may
be needed. Also, this technique, just as Canonical Correlation, does not deal with any kind
unobserved heterogeneity. To remedy this drawback, two solutions have very recently been
proposed:
 First, if one is willing to assume that sorting occurs on a single index of attrac-
tiveness, one could apply the strategy developed by Chiappori et al. (2012). This
strategy consists in estimating the conditional expectations E [YkjX = x], which, if
the sorting actually occurs on a single-index, should be a deterministic function of
0X. Hence the weight vector  is identied up to a constant by the marginal rates
of substitutions
i
j
=
@E [YkjX = x] =@xi
@E [YkjX = x] =@xj :
 Moving outside of single-dimensional indices, Dupuy and Galichon (2012) have in-
troduced a technique they call saliency analysis, which allows to infer the number
of dimensions on which sorting occurs, and estimate the corresponding (possibly
multiple) indices of attractiveness that determine this sorting. Saliency analysis
is based on the estimation and the singular value decomposition of the quadratic
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surplus function of the matching. The idea is to estimate A in the quadratic speci-
cation for the surplus function
 (x; y) = x0Ay
and, using a singular value decomposition to test whether the dimension of A is e.g.
one, in which case A = 0. This provides a consistent estimation of  and . We
refer to Dupuy and Galichon (2012) for a detailed exposition of the procedure.
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